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Case No. 20090463-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOEL SCOTT MCNEARNEY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for burglary, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (wLst 2009).* 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a fully built house ready for occupancy and being shown to 
prospective buyers is a "dwelling," for purposes of the burglary statute? 
Standard of Review. "[A] question of statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law, [is] reviewed for correctness. State v. Tanner, 2009 UT App 326, 
221 P.3d 901 (citing State v. Jeffiies, 2009 UT 57, f 4, 217 F 
1
 Citation to the Utah Code and the codes of other jurisdictions 
throughout this brief is to the current code. Changes to sections of any code 
which have been amended since the incident at issue in 
the disposition of this case. 
.3d 265). 
this case do not affect 
2. Whether the trial court erred in not giving a lesser included offense 
instruction when it ruled, as a matter of law, that a building constructed to be 
home is a dwelling? 
Standard of Review. "A trial court's refusal to grant a lesser included 
offense instruction is a question of law, which [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, % 12,154 P.3d 788. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN § 76-1-402 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-201 (West Supp. 2009), -202 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), and 
unlawful possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-205 (West 2004). Rl-2. Before trial, the trial court 
accepted the parties' stipulation that a bag containing tools, toilet screw caps, 
and a stolen key would be admissible in exchange for the dismissal of the 
charges of theft and unlawful possession of burglary tools. R124:6-7. A jury 
convicted Defendant of burglary, as charged. R60. The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to a statutory one-to-fifteen-year term in the Utah State Prison, but 
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suspended the prison term and placed Defendant on probation for thirty-six 
months. R112-13. Defendant timely appealed. R115. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brent Roberts built two houses next to each other uh West Valley City, one 
in which he resided and one of which he intended to ^ell. R124:28-29. The 
house for sale had been on the market for about four months. Id. at 29. The 
house was "completely finished/' and except for a 
appliances were in. Id. at 30. "It was a totally functional house." Id. A "For 
Sale" sign stood outside the house, which was being shown to people by a 
realtor. Id. at 30, 41. The house was in a subdivision in which "just a few 
homes [had been] built," among which perhaps one or two were being lived in. 
refrigerator, all the 
Id. at 41. 
On the evening of January 6,2008, Mr. Roberts weht to the house to turn 
on a light and noticed that the front door knob had bebi "mashed" and the 
realtor's key box had been taken. Id. at 31. Mr. Roberts immediately called the 
police. Id. Officer Peck responded to the call. Id. at 32 
went through the house and found nothing had been disturbed. Id. at 32, 46. 
Officer Peck, who was on call that night, gave Mr. Robert^ his card and then left. 
He and Mr. Roberts 
Id. at 33. 
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Concerned about security, Mr. Roberts placed a baby monitor in the house 
so that he could hear any activity "if anything happens inside the house/7 Id. 
He locked up the house and returned to his own home. Id. at 34. At about 9:30 
that night he heard "at least a couple of voices" — "conversation going on" — and 
things being taken apart and moved around inside the house —tools "clinking 
and clanking." Id. at 34-35. Mr. Roberts called Officer Peck and told him what 
he was hearing. Id. at 36. 
Officer Chris Coombs quickly responded to the call. Id. at 36, 91. He, 
with Mr. Roberts following behind, entered the house through the front door. 
Id. They immediately saw that the rear sliding door was wide open. Id. When 
they reached the master bathroom, they found that the toilet had been removed 
from the pipe and the nuts for the toilet lay on the floor, but that the white screw 
caps that cover the nuts were gone. Id. at 36-38,40. Someone had also begun to 
remove the toilet in the other bathroom. Id. at 37. 
West Valley City Police Officer Kevin Peck arrived at the scene after 
Officer Coombs. Id. at 43-44,49-50. Observing Officer Coombs and Mr. Roberts 
approaching the front door, Officer Peck drove around the corner to view the 
rear of the house. R50. There he saw two men, dressed in black, running away. 
Id. at 51. Officer Peck first pursued the men in his car, then on foot. Id. at 52-53. 
After a chase, he apprehended Defendant. Id. at 53-57. Officer Peck searched 
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Defendant and found in his pants pockets a key, a headlamp, and a couple of 
white plastic caps. R58. The key was to the burgled hoiise. Id, at 63. 
At the scene, Defendant admitted that he had gone to the front of the 
house. Two sets of footprints were found leading from the rear of the house to 
the front. Id, at 66-68. One set of prints appeared to match Defendant's boots. 
Id, at 69. Following that same set of prints, Officer Peck fqmnd a black bag about 
20 feet from the house. Id, at 70. Inside the bag were a number of tools typically 
used in burglaries. R72-74. The other man who fled was 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed 
verdict to change the burglary of a dwelling charge, a second degree felony, to 
burglary of a building, a third degree felony. Id, at 98. Defendant argued that 
never found. Id, at 64. 
because the house was unoccupied and no one had ever spent the night in it, it 
was not a " dwelling" within the meaning of the statu tp. Id, The trial court 
denied the motion. Id, at 102. 
Defendant testified that he was a project foreman trying to cut costs on a 
remodeling project and that he accepted an offer from an acquaintance, Preston, 
who said that he had a couple of toilets. R124:102-09. Defendant claimed that 
he felt the circumstances were suspicious when the toilets were not at Preston's 
house and they had to drive to the house in question late in the evening. Id, at 
110-12. Preston, however, assured him that "it was fine. . everything is okay.' 
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Id. at 112. When they arrived at the house, Preston, who was carrying a bag, 
told Defendant to wait at the rear of the house. Preston went to the front of the 
house, opened the rear sliding door from inside, and asked Defendant to come 
in and help him. Id. at 113-15,118. In spite ot Preston's entreaties, Defendant 
refused to enter because he now believed "there's something illegal going on." 
Id. at 116-120. Preston went back into the darkened house. Id. at 121, 135. 
Suddenly, he came out of the house yelling "Police. . . . The cops are here," 
knocking Defendant back, and handing him "some things." Id. at 121-22. 
Defendant put the things in his pocket and ran. Id. at 122. 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Defendant's request for 
a lesser included offense instruction on third degree burglary. Id. at 147-49; see 
R70 (Defendant's requested instruction on burglary of a "building"). At that 
point, the court first elaborated its reasons for denying Defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict. The court stated that it had read State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 
(Utah App. 1992) and its progeny "as not requiring that the dwelling actually be 
inhabited, only that the purpose for which the dwelling is created is that it be 
habitable." Id. at 148. Accordingly, the court ruled that its legal interpretation 
of the statute precluded the requested instruction. Id. at 149. Based on its legal 
interpretation and the absence of any evidence that the structure in question was 
-6-
not a home, the court also refused to allow Defendant tj) argue in closing that 
the house was not a dwelling. Id. at 150-52. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by incorrectly interpreting the 
term "dwelling" in denying his motion for a directed verdict to amend the 
offense to a third degree burglary of a building. He contends that under Utah 
law that a building is not a "dwelling" until it has been 
who has not expressed an intent to abandon it. Contrary to Defendant's claim, 
this Court has interpreted Utah's burglary statute to sweep more broadly. The 
statute defines "dwelling" to mean any building "usually occupied by a person 
occupied by someone 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." This 
Court has interpreted "usually occupied," to refer," not to whether the building 
is actually occupied, but "to the purpose for which the structure is used." This 
construction essentially recognizes that Utah's understanding of "dwelling," for 
purposes of burglary, includes a building that are intended to serve as place of 
habitation. This interpretation comports with Utah's interest in protecting 
people in the security of their homes. The house at issue in this case was a 
"completely finished," "totally functional house," up fot sale and being shown 
by a realtor. The owner was visiting the house daily to secure it. Accordingly, 
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there was a substantial likelihood that an intruder would encounter someone 
within the house. In these circumstances, Defendant should not be permitted to 
avoid a second degree felony on the happenstance that the house had not yet 
sold or was not secured by the owner personally remaining on the premises. 
II. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to give a lesser included offense 
instruction on third degree burglary of a building. The trial court correctly 
interpreted the statute to mean that a house constructed to be a home, i.e., a 
building usually occupied as a lodging at night, was a dwelling. This 
determination involved a question of law, and, as such, was not one for the jury 
to determine. Even if that determination was not purely a question of law, the 
court was still not required to give the instruction because there existed no 
rational basis in the evidence that the house at issue was not a home intended to 
be usually occupied as nighttime lodging. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UNDER THE BURGLARY STATUTE, A HOUSE WHOSE 
PURPOSE IS THAT IT BE USED FOR OVERNIGHT LODGING 
IS A "DWELLING" 
Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
directed verdict to amend the offense to a third degree burglary of a building/' 
Aplt. Br. at 9-16, at 9. Specifically, he argues that "[u]nder Utah law, a newly 
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built structure that has never been lived in, although constructed for the 
purpose of human habitation, does not fit the statutory definition of a dwelling/' 
Id. Defendant understates the reach of Utah's burglary statute. 
Defendant does not challenge that he committed $ burglary. Indeed, he 
requests that a conviction be entered for third degree felony burglary of a 
building. Aplt. Br. at 22. Rather, he argues only that th4 house he burglarized 
was not a dwelling, which makes his crime a third degree felony. Id. at 9-16. 
Because Utah's statute and this Court have broadly interpreted the meaning of 
"dwelling," the "completely finished/' "totally functional house" was a 
dwelling for the purposes of the burglary statute. 
"'Dwelling' means a building which is usually Occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." UTAH 
CODE ANN. 76-6-201(2) (West Supp. 2009). Applying that definition, this Court 
held that a mountain cabin, in which the owner, who lived in town and spent 
only two or three days a week in the cabin, was a dwelling. State v. Cox, 826 
P.2d 656, 658, 662 (Utah App. 1992). This Court held thkt "[t]he term 'usually 
occupied' refers to the pwpose for which tlie structure is used!' Id. at 662 
(emphasis added). "If the structure is one in which people typically stay 
overnight, it fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute." 
Id. See also State v. Gates, 2006 UT App 256U, pp. 1-2 (unpublished 
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memorandum decision) (applying Cox definition to hold a fully outfitted 
mountain cabin, slept in the night before the burglary, was the type of structure 
that could "typically be expected" to be used for overnight lodging and was, 
therefore, a dwelling); State v. Oakley, 2005 UT App 89U, p. 1 (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (applying Cox to hold evidence sufficient that 
burglarized cabin was a dwelling). 
"Purpose" is "[t]hat which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, 
intention, or aim, object, plan, project." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
Thus, contrary to Defendant's argument, the building need not have a specific 
occupant living in the structure on or about the time of the illegal entry, see Aplt. 
Br. at 9-16. Rather, a dwelling is simply the type of structure that is intended or 
expected to be one in which people typically stay overnight. This view is 
bolstered by the fact that, for the purposes of burglary, the statute does not 
require that a person be present at the time of the offense. 
This Court's interpretation of the statutory definition of "dwelling" to 
include a vacant structure in which no one has yet resided has been followed in 
at least one other jurisdiction defining "dwelling" much like Utah does. In State 
v. Hobbs, 2009 WL 2225529 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (attached at Addendum B), 
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two individuals bought a house to renovate and sell. Id. at p.l.2 They never 
lived in the house. Id. Four days before the scheduled closing on the house, one 
of the owners discovered that the house had been broken into and building 
material stolen. Id. The owner repaired the damage and hired two men to stay 
in the house to secure it. Id. Two days before the expected closing, Hobbs was 
apprehended after breaking into and entering the house. Id. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Hobbs' claim that the house was 
not a dwelling because someone had not lived in the building in the immediate 
past. Id. at 1-2. "The burglary statute/' the court began,' defines 'dwelling7 as 'a 
building used as a permanent or temporary residence/" Minn. Stat. § 609.581(3) 
(2009). The court noted that it had previously determined that the word "used" 
in that definition is a participial adjective, not a verb, ^nd therefore "has no 
tense." Id. at p.2 (citing State v. Edwards, 589 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999). Expanding, the court observed that "the word 'used' frequently is 
'resorted to for such descriptive purposes even though the article being 
described is not at the moment in actual use in any respect.'" Id. (quoting 
Edwards, 589 N.W.2d at 810). The court also noted tjiat "the legislature's 
concern 'about the distress and lingering fear' caused by residential burglary, 
2
 "Unpublished opinions of the [Minnesota] Coiirt of Appeals are not 
precedential," but they may be cited with adequate notice to other counsel. 
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 (2009). 
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regardless of whether anyone is living in the building at the time of the 
burglary/' Id. (citing State v. Kowski, 423 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988)). Based on that concern, the statutory language, and its prior opinions, the 
court held that "a building may be considered a 'dwelling' within the meaning 
of the burglary statute if its owner intends it to be used as a residence, 
regardless of whether anyone is residing in the building at the time of the 
burglary." Id.3 
3
 Other states have manifested the same objective with more specific 
language. See e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-39-101 (4)(A) (2001) ("'Residential 
occupiable structure' means a . . . structure (i) [i]n which any person lives [,] or 
(ii) [t]hat is customarily used for overnight accommodation of a person whether 
or not a person is actually present."); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.011(2) (2007) 
("'Dwelling' means a building. . . which has a roof over it and is designed to be 
occupied by people lodging therein at night " ) ; , 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 2-
6(b) (1987) ("'[D] welling' means a house [or] mobile h o m e . . . which at the time 
of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence 
intend within a reasonable period of time to reside."); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
3110(7) (2008) ("'Dwelling' means a bui lding. . . or other enclosed space which 
is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence."). 
Accordingly, courts in those states have concluded that structures in 
circumstances similar to the house in this case were dwellings. See Julian v. 
State, 767 S.W.2d 300 (Ark. 1989) (mobile home was "occupiable structure" 
within meaning of burglary statute even though no one was residing in it and 
even though owner had never set it up for occupancy by attaching utilities, 
where structure was of a type customarily used for overnight lodging and was 
indistinguishable from other mobile homes located together and rented); State v. 
Bennett, 565 So. 2d 803, 804-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (unsold 
mobile home on sales lot, which was fully furnished but unoccupied and not 
connected to utilities, would constitute a "dwelling" for purposes of burglary 
prosecution if it was actually to be used for habitation); State v. Alvis, 53 P.3d 
1232,1233-34 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (unoccupied house still under construction 
-12-
Like Minnesota, this Court in Cox has simultaneously recognized the 
forward-looking character of the term "usually occupied," — i.e., the "purpose" 
or intent intrinsic to the structure itself—and the breadth of legislative concern 
in protecting people. The Cox court thus concluded that "our second degree 
burglary statute is intended to protect people while in places where they are 
likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting property in 
buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages." Coxf 829 P.2d at 662 
that protection of the (emphasis added). Other authorities have emphasized 
home is the paramount concern of the burglary statutes: 
The notable severity of burglary penalties is accounted for by the 
fact that the offense was originally confined to violent nighttime 
assault on the dwelling. The dwelling was and remains each man's 
castle, the final refuge from which he need not flee even if the 
alternative is to take the life of an assailant. It is the place of 
security for his family, as well as his most cherished possessions. 
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.1 at 67 (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980). 
Defendant's argument, on the other hand, dobs not adequately or 
reasonably support the legislative purpose of protecting people likely to be 
residing in a house such as the one in this case. Defendant's authorities insist 
that to qualify as a dwelling a "building... is used regularly as a place to sleep. 
but into which owner was to move in 5 days was dWellin 
burglary statute and thus a "person" felony for sentencin 
g for purpose of 
g purposes). 
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. . [and] [i]t is not such before the first dweller has moved in nor after the last 
dweller has moved out with no intention of returning . . . ." Aplt. Br. at 11 
(quoting Wallace v. State, 494 A.2d 970, 974 (Md. Ct. App 1985)) (brackets 
added).4 As explained, the construction Defendant assigns to "dwelling" — the 
actual or prior occupancy of the building—is not that by which this Court, by its 
use of the phrase, " purpose for which the structure is used," has defined 
"dwelling." Further, these authorities do not adequately take into account that 
"[Utah's] second degree burglary statute is intended to protect people while in 
places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight " Cox, 829 P.2d 
at 662 (emphasis added). 
The State does not dispute that prior occupancy without notice of intent to 
abandon may well indicate the likelihood of present, ongoing occupancy. But in 
drafting the burglary statutes the legislature made a policy decision that a 
homeowner's possible presence would not be left to chance. The legislature 
determined to apply the greater penalty to any person who, with the requisite 
4
 See also Aplt Br. at 13-15, wherein Defendant cites a number of cases, 
including Watson v. State, 179 So. 2d 826,827 (Miss. 1965) (building, intended as 
dwelling, under construction and nearing completion but not yet occupied was 
not a dwelling house under statute); Johns v. Commonwealth, 675 S.E.2d 211, 214-
15 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (building under renovation, unfurnished, and without 
electricity must actually have been used as habitation to constitute a dwelling). 
But see Starnes v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Ky. 1980) (house from 
which owners were moving and from which personalty was stolen was still 
"usually occupied"). 
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intent, unlawfully entered the kind of building " usually 
lodging therein at night" because one cannot know when such a building might 
have someone in it. That is the reason the statute completes the definition of 
"dwelling" by providing "whether or not a person is actually present. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2). Thus, a burglar bears the risk of incurring the greater 
penalty whenever he burglarizes the kind of building people usually occupy. 
Society does not bear that risk. 
The house at issue is the type of building the legislature sought to protect 
occupied by a person 
with the greater penalty — a building in which there mi ght be a person. The 
house was "completely finished" — except for a refrigerator, all the appliances 
were in." R124:30. "It was a totally functional house." Id. The house had been 
on the market for about four months, a "For Sale" sign stq>od outside the house, 
and it was being shown to people by a realtor. Id. at 3D-31, 41. There were 
other newly built houses in the subdivision being lived in. Id. at 41. Mr. 
Roberts, the owner of the house, had built his own home next door. Id. at 29. 
He was apparently at the house daily, turning the lights bn in the house in the 
evenings for some time prior to the burglary. Id. at 31. Indeed, if Mr. Roberts 
did not have the baby monitor close at hand, by which he could listen for any 
activity from the safety of his own home, he might Very well have been 
compelled to stand watch within the house once he ha|i discovered that the 
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keybox had been taken. Id. at 31, 34. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the 
house was not merely a building, a structure "adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons." Aplt. Br. at 13 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
201(1) (West Supp. 2009). Rather, the circumstances of this case flesh out "the 
purpose for which the structure is used": a house which will unquestionably be 
used for overnight lodging and one in which people will "typically stay 
overnight." See Cox, 656 P.2d at 662. In such circumstances, Defendant should 
not be permitted to avoid a second degree felony on the happenstance that the 
house, fully ready to be moved into, was not yet sold or was not personally 
being secured by the owner. 
II. 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT A HOME IS A DWELLING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND NO EVIDENCE CONTRADICTED THAT 
INTERPRETATION, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON 
BURGLARY OF A BUILDING 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to send the case to the 
jury with his requested lesser included offense instruction on third degree 
burglary of a building, thereby denying him the right to submit his theory of the 
defense. Aplt. Br. at 16-21. Because the trial court correctly determined that the 
fully completed home was, as a matter of law, a dwelling, Defendant was not 
entitled to the instruction. 
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A. Background facts. 
The trial court denied Defendant's request for a lesser included offense 
instruction on third degree burglary. Id. at 147-49; 
requested instruction on burglary of a "building"). The court stated that it had 
read Cox and its progeny "as not requiring that the 
inhabited, only that the purpose for which the dwelling 
habitable/' Id. at 148. The court particularly relied on State v. Herrick, 965 P.2d 
844 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998), in which the Kansas Court of 
see R70 (Defendant's 
dwelling actually be 
is created is that it be 
Appeals, relying on a 
definition of dwelling as a building intended for use as hitman habitation, supra 
n.3, held that an unoccupied house, strewn with doors ahd windows and used 
as storage was nevertheless a dwelling. Id.5 Accordingly, the court ruled that 
this Court's legal interpretation of the statute in Cox precluded the requested 
instruction. Id. at 149. Based on Cox's interpretation ahd the absence of any 
evidence that the structure in question was not a home, the court also refused to 
allow Defendant to argue in closing that the house was not a dwelling. Id. at 
150-52. 
5
 The record does not state the name of the case, btat the facts recited by 
the trial court—a Kansas decision describing wood and "^vhat have you strewn 
around and that it was being used solely for storagp" — describe Herrick. 
R124148. 
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B. Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser 
included offense of burglary of a building, 
'Tactual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such 
as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as 
well as the subjective, such as state of mind/ ' State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, j^ 16, 
220 P.3d 1198 (refusing to reach the issue of whether a defendant in Utah has 
the right to have a jury determine the fact of his prior convictions before he can 
be sentenced because it raised a pure question of law) (citation omitted). 
"Questions of law are 'essentially [questions] of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances/" Id. 
(citation omitted). "[Tjhe United States Supreme Court . . . stated that 
'mischievous consequences . . . would flow from' permitting juries to answer 
questions of law." Id. at f 14 (citation omitted). "What one jury may 'declare 
constitutional today another jury may declare unconstitutional tomorrow/" Id. 
(citation omitted). "Thus, it is the role of the judge to 'instruct the jury on the 
law and to insist that the jury follow his [or her] instructions/" Id. (citation 
omitted). "It is the role of the jury to find facts and apply them to the judge's 
instructions on the law." Id. (citation omitted). "Thus, a defendant does not 
have the right, constitutional or statutory, to a jury trial when only 'pure 
questions of law' need to be decided." Id. (citation omitted). 
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Here, the trial court decided a pure question of law, to wit: Whether the 
statutory definition of "dwelling/' includes a fully completed home, ready for 
occupancy. Here, the trial court correctly ruled that a building constructed to 
be a home was, as a matter of law, a dwelling. R124:148, As a principle of law, 
that matter was not for the jury to decide otherwise. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, f 16. 
Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to give the instruction. But even if 
this Court deemed the question not to be one of law, defendant was still not 
entitled to the instruction. 
"[A] defendant is entitled to a requested leaser-included offense 
instruction if (1) the two offenses are related because sime of their statutory 
elements overlap, and the evidence at trial of the greater offense involves proof 
of some or all of those overlapping elements; and (2) the evidence provides a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense. 
22, If 18, 20 P.3d 888 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983)). "In 
determining existence of a rational basis, the court does not judge the credibility 
of the evidence, but only decides "whether there is a Sufficient quantum of 
evidence presented to justify sending the question to the jury." State v. ]aimez, 
State v. Evans, 2001 UT 
819 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Baker, 671 P 
the court must view the evidence and the inferences that ckn be drawn from it in 
2d at 159). "Further, 
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the light most favorable to the defense/' Id. (citing State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 
532 (Utah 1983)). 
Section 76-1-402(3) states that a lesser offense is included when "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (West 
2004). For purposes of this case, the State does not dispute that third degree 
burglary of a building is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary of a 
dwelling. 
Defendant's request for the lesser included instruction, however, does not 
survive the rational basis test. The trial court concluded that no evidence 
showed the house at issue was not a home. R124:152. The record indisputably 
supports that conclusion, and Defendant does not dispute it. See Cox, 826 P.2d 
at 662-63 (upholding denial of request for lesser included instruction where "no 
evidence was presented suggesting that [the] defendant entered the property 
with intent to commit a crime other than theft"); Ryan v. State, 865 So. 2d 1239, 
1243-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding evidence did not support giving of jury 
instruction on second-degree burglary, as lesser-included offense of first-degree 
burglary, where trial court determined, as matter of law, that hunting house 
was "dwelling" for purposes of first-degree burglary statute, and not 
"building," and no evidence indicated hunting house was anything other than 
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dwelling). In sum, because the trial court correctly determined that a house 
constructed to be a home, i.e., a building to be usually occupied for overnight 
lodging, and no evidence was presented that the house in question was not 
constructed for that purpose, Defendant was not entitled to a lesser included 
offense instruction on third degree burglary. Cox, 826 P.2d at 662-63. 
If, however, the Court should determine that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the constructed home was a building, the Court should remand the case to 
the district court with instruction that a conviction for third degree burglary be 
entered, as Defendant has requested. Aplt. Br. at 22. 
may modify criminal convictions and enter judgments oi conviction for a lesser 
included offense on appeal." State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 
App. 1996) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (West 2C)04); State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1209-11 (Utah 1993). See State v. Bolsinger, 699 
Utah appellate courts 
146,150 n.2 (Utah Ct. 
P.2d 1214,1221 (Utah 
1985) (remanding case to the trial court with directions to set aside the verdict 
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter! where the defendant 
conceded that his conduct created a grave risk of harm which necessarily 
includes "recklessness," the requisite state of mind for manslaughter), disagreed 
with on other grounds, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 rl.3 (Utah 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May 13,2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (West 2004) 
criminal episode-Included offenses 
Separate offenses krising out of single 
all separate offenses (1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any |; 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
such provision bars a 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a sin| 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
gle criminal episode, 
sball not be subject to 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at tfie time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the ofil 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offel 
included when: 
[ense charged but may 
se. An offense is so E 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the| 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
facts required to 
of preparation to 
therein; or 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judg] 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by 
appellate court on 
to support a 
to support a 
found every fact 
jment of conviction 
br the included 
the defendant. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-201 (West Supp. 2009) - Definitions 
As used in this part: 
(l)(a) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, 
trailer, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or 
for carrying on business and includes: 
(i) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(ii) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(b) "Building" does not include a railroad car. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the 
building at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully" means a person enters or remains in or on any premises 
when: 
(a) at the time of the entry or remaining, the premises or any portion of the premises 
are not open to the public; and 
(b) the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or any portion of the premises. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
(5) "Railroad car": 
(a) in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a sleeping car or any container or 
trailer that is on a railroad car; and 
(b) includes only a railroad car that is operable and part of an ongoing railroad 
operation. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-201; Laws 2008, c. 366, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008. 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-6-202 (West 2004) - Burglary 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-202; Laws 2001, c. 359, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, 
1st Sp.Sess., c. 4, § 2, eff. July 5, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 325, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
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Sufficient evidence existed that house was a 
"dwelling" for defendant's conviction for 
first-degree burglary. The evidence indi-
cated that victim renovated, maintained, and 
sold the house as a single-family home. 
When victim saw that the house had been 
damaged, he took precautions to secure the 
house pending its imminent sale. As a result, 
two people were lawfully present in the 
house, intended 
at the time of 
was no evidence 
abandon the 
o sleep there for the night 
the burglary. Further, there 
that defendant intended to 
M.S.A.S 609.581. house 
Hennepin County District Court, File No. 
27-CR-07-12072B. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, 
MN, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin 
County Attorney, 
County Attorney, 
spondent. 
Linda M. Freyer, Assistant 
Minneapolis, MN, for re-
Lawrence Hamiherling, Chief Appellate 
Public Defender, Rachel Foster Bond, Assis-
tant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for ap-
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Presiding Judge 
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decided by BJORKMAN, 
WORKE, Judge; and 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION 
BJORKMAK Judge. 
*1 In this appeal from his conviction of first-
degree burglary, appellant argues that (1) the 
evidence is insufficient to support his con-
viction because the building he entered wras 
not a "dwelling" within the meaning of the 
burglary statute, Minn.Stat §§ 609.581, 
subd. 3, .582, subd. 1(a) (2006), and (2) the 
district court erred in instructing the jury 
regarding the definition of "dwelling." We 
affirm. 
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FACTS 
In March 2005, A.S. and his father-in-law 
purchased a single-family home located at 
2909 Bryant Avenue North in Minneapolis. 
A.S. renovated the house and put it on the 
market in September 2006. The sale of the 
property was scheduled to close on October 
31,2007. 
On October 27, 2007, while conducting his 
weekly check of the vacant house, A.S. dis-
covered that someone had broken in through 
a basement window and stolen copper pip-
ing. He replaced the piping and hired two 
individuals, J.W. and T.H., to stay in the 
house until the closing to prevent future 
break-ins. J.W. and T.H. arrived at the house 
at approximately 8:30 p.m. on October 29, 
2007, bringing a gun for protection. They 
were checking window locks throughout the 
house when they heard a noise in the base-
ment. T.H. ran down to the basement, where 
he saw a man halfway through a basement 
window. The man appeared to be entering 
the house, and T.H. yelled at him to get out. 
J.W. fired the gun at the man, who yelled, 
"Ow," and left. J .W. then called 911, and 
Officer Christopher Tuma of the Minneapo-
lis Police Department responded. J.W. and 
T.H. gave Tuma a description of the in-
truder. 
Around the same time, Minneapolis Police 
Officer Ross Lapp responded to a 911 call 
from 3811 Bryant Avenue North regarding a 
shooting victim. As Lapp approached that 
house, he saw appellant Willie Hobbs, who 
was wearing clothing that matched the de-
scription of the intruder and had sustained a 
gunshot wound. 
Hobbs was charged with first-degree bur-
glary of an occupied dwelling. Hobbs 
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that 
the house at 2909 Bryant was not a "dwell-
ing" on October 29, 2007; the district court 
denied the motion. At Hobbs's request, the 
district court instructed the jury on both the 
charged offense and the lesser-included of-
fense of third-degree burglary. The jury ac-
quitted Hobbs of third-degree burglary but 
found him guilty of first-degree burglary.— 
This appeal follows. 
FN1. Hobbs subsequently moved for 
a judgment of acquittal, arguing that 
the verdicts were inconsistent. The 
district court denied the motion, and 
Hobbs does not challenge the denial 
in this appeal. 
DECISION 
I. A single-family home that is vacant 
during renovation or pending sale is a 
"dwelling" for purposes of the burglary 
statute. 
Hobbs argues that the house at 2909 Bryant 
was not a "dwelling" within the meaning of 
the burglary statute and that the district court 
erroneously instructed the jury on the defini-
tion of "dwelling." Because both of Hobbs's 
arguments implicate the statutory definition 
of "dwelling," we first examine the language 
of the burglary statute. See State v. Edwards, 
589 N.W.2d 807. 810 (Minn.App. 1999) ("A 
burglary conviction will not be sustained 
where the building is not within the statutory 
definition."), review denied (Minn. May 18. 
1999). 
*2 The primary objective of statutory inter-
pretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the 
intention of the legislature." Minn.Stat. § 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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645.16 (2008); see also State v. Zeimet 696 
N.W.2d 79U 793-94 (Minn.2005). "Where 
the legislature's intent is clearly discernable 
from plain and unambiguous language, 
statutory construction is neither necessary 
nor permitted and we apply the statute's 
plain meaning." State v. Williams, 762 
N.W.2d 583, 585 (Minn.ApD.2009) (quota-
tion omitted), review denied (Minn. May 27, 
2009). 
The burglary statute defines "dwelling" as 
"a building used as a permanent or tempo-
rary residence." Minn.Stat. § 609.581, subd. 
3. We have previously determined that the 
word "used" in that definition is a participial 
adjective, not a verb, and therefore "has no 
tense." Edwards, 589 N.W.2d at 811 (ob-
serving that the word "used" frequently is 
"resorted to for such descriptive purposes 
even though the article being described is 
not at the moment in actual use in any re-
spect" (quotation omitted)). The word "resi-
dence" commonly means "[t]he act or fact 
of living in a given placesfor some time," or 
"[a] house or other fixed abode." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1335 (8th ed.2004); see also 
The American Heritage Dictionary 1483 
(4th ed.2006) (defining "residence" as "[t]he 
place in which one lives"). 
We previously interpreted the term "dwell-
ing" in a case similar to this one involving a 
house that was vacant at the time of a bur-
glary. In State v. Kowski, we discussed the 
burglary of an unfinished vacation home. 
423 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Minn.App. 1988). 
Cognizant of the legislature's concern "about 
the distress and lingering fear" caused by 
residential burglary, regardless of whether 
anyone is living in the building at the time 
of the burglary, we held that a building "re-
mains a dwelling" regardless of the amount 
of time the owher has been away, if the 
owner does not intend to abandon it. Id. at 
709-10. "An owner's intent to return to a 
dwelling is the crucial factor in determining 
whether a structure retains its character as a 
dwelling in the owner's absence ." Id. at 710. 
Because the owner in Kowski intended to 
return and use k as a residence, we con-
cluded that the vacant and unfinished vaca-
f dwelling." A* tion home was a 1 
Hobbs contends that our subsequent deci-
sion in Edwards added a second requirement 
for a building to be considered a dwelling-
use of the building as a residence in the im-
mediate past. But Hobbs misconstrues Ed-
wards, which explicitly distinguished 
Kowski based on unique facts. Edwards, 589 
N.W.2dat811. We held in Edwards that the 
apartment of a recently murdered woman 
was a "dwelling,' despite the lack of evi-
dence regarding the woman's future inten-
tion with respect to the apartment, because 
the "apartment had immediate past residen-
tial use." Id. We explained that the Kowski 
intent requirement "is used to distinguish 
between buildings that are residences, be 
they temporary or permanent, and buildings 
that are abandoned." Id. Although Edwards 
further analyzed the language of the bur-
glary statute, explaining the adjectival nature 
of the word "used? in the statutory definition 
of "dwelling," Edwards did not replace or 
modify Kowski. 
*3 Based on the plain language of the statute 
and our previous interpretations of that lan-
guage in Kowski and Edwards, we conclude 
that a building* may be considered a "dwell-
ing" within the meaning of the burglary 
statute if its owner intends it to be used as a 
residence, regardless of whether anyone is 
residing in the building at the time of the 
2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov!. Works 
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burglary. Thus, the definition of "dwelling" 
in the burglary statute includes a single-
family home that is vacant during renovation 
or pending sale. 
II. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's 
determination that the house at 2909 Bry-
ant was a dwelling. 
Hobbs argues that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to prove that the house at 2909 Bryant 
was a "dwelling." On a claim of insufficient 
evidence, we conduct a thorough review of 
the record to determine "whether the facts in 
the record and the legitimate inferences 
drawn from them would permit the jury to 
reasonably conclude that the defendant was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis v. 
State, 595 N.W.2d 520. 525 (Minn. 1999) 
(quotation omitted). We review the record in 
the light most favorable to the conviction 
and will not disturb the verdict if the jury, 
acting with due regard for the presumption 
of innocence and the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably 
conclude that the defendant was guilty as 
charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 
465, 476-77 (Minn.2004). 
There is no dispute that the house at 2909 
Bryant was a single-family home intended 
for use as a residence. Although A.S. did not 
live in the house on October 29, 2007, there 
is no evidence that he intended to abandon 
the house. Rather, A.S. renovated, main-
tained, and sold the house as a single-family 
home. When he saw that the house had been 
damaged, he took precautions to secure the 
house pending its imminent sale. As a result, 
two people were lawfully present in the 
house, intending to sleep there for the night, 
at the time of the burglary. The evidence 
supports the jury's finding that the house at 
2909 Bryant was a "dwelling." 
III. The district court did not err in in-
structing the jury on the definition of 
"dwelling." 
Hobbs also argues that the district court 
erred in instructing the jury on the definition 
of "dwelling." District courts have consider-
able latitude in formulating jury instructions. 
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 681-82 
(Minn.2007). We review jury instructions 
"in their entirety to determine whether they 
fairly and adequately explained the law of 
the case." State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 
155 (Minn. 1988). A jury instruction is erro-
neous "if it materially misstates the law." 
State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 736 
(Minn.2005). 
Over Hobbs's objection, the district court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
The elements of burglary in the first de-
gree are, first, the property involved in this 
case was a dwelling. A dwelling means a 
building used as a permanent or temporary 
residence. A building used as a permanent 
or temporary residence does not lose its 
residential character simply because it has 
been vacant for a certain period of time so 
long as the owner did not permanently 
abandon it. 
*4 The first two sentences oi ine msiruciion 
came from the jury-instruction guide, 10 
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJ1G 17.02 
(2006), but the district court added the last 
sentence based on Edwards and Kowski. 
Hobbs argues that the instruction amounted 
to a directed verdict and misstated the lawr. 
We disagree. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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First, the instruction did not effectively di-
rect a verdict against Hobbs because the dis-
trict court's further instruction on the ele-
ments of third-degree burglary demonstrated 
that the jury could find the dwelling element 
was not met. The district court explained 
that the law permits a conviction of a lesser 
crime if the jury finds a person not guilty of 
the greater crime and instructed the jury that 
"[a] lesser crime in this case is burglary in 
the third degree." The district court also 
stated that the jury could find Hobbs guilty 
of third-degree burglary if it found all the 
elements of that offense met but some of the 
elements of first-degree burglary not met. 
The only elements of first-degree burglary 
that are not elements of third-degree bur-
glary are the status of the building as a 
dwelling and the presence of another person 
in the building at the time of the offense. 
Compare Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) 
with Minn.Stat $ 609.582, subd. 3 (2006). 
There is no dispute that others were present 
at 2909 Bryant when Hobbs entered the 
house. Because the third-degree-burglary 
instruction indicated to the jury that it could 
reasonably find the dwelling element not 
met, the first-degree-burglary instruction did 
not direct the jury's verdict. 
Second, the "dwelling" instruction was not a 
misstatement of the law. As the district court 
indicated, the instruction was drawn directly 
from Kowski, in which we not only held that 
a building remains a dwelling "[rjegardless 
of the length of time an owner is absent 
from the structure," but also determined that 
"the legislature did not intend that a struc-
ture lose its residential character simply be-
cause it is vacant for a certain period of time 
before the burglary." 423 N.W.2d at 710. 
The district court did not err in instructing 
the jury on the meaning of "dwelling," 
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Inn.App.) 
Affirmed. 
Minn.App.,2009 
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